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Attack Surface Analysis of BlackBerry Devices

Introduction

The BlackBerry device and supporting platform are developed by Research In Motion (RIM), a Canadian soft-

ware and hardware company based in Waterloo, Ontario. One of the BlackBerry's main selling points is that

it provides an integrated wireless messaging system, providing push email access over cellular wireless net-

works throughout the world. Another major factor in the BlackBerry's popularity is its comprehensive and

systematic approach to security. BlackBerry devices are versatile, and can be used for a range of functions

including telephony, SMS, email, and Web browsing amongst other things.

BlackBerry users can generally be divided into two camps: consumers who bought and own their BlackBerry,

and enterprise end-users who are given the use of a BlackBerry by their employers. Consumer devices are

generally configured to use BlackBerry Internet Service (BIS), while enterprise devices are generally config-

ured to use BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES). In a BIS environment, the end-user is generally responsible

for the appropriate configuration of security measures. In a BES environment, the end-user has a certain

amount of control, but security is usually enforced by the enterprise, via the use of an IT Policy and

Application Controls. More comprehensive controls are available in a BES deployment than in a BIS deploy-

ment, and the default configuration of an enterprise device is generally more constrained than the equiva-

lent consumer deployment of that device (for example, the firewall is enabled by default). See the Mitigation

section for more details.

While the BlackBerry solution has a comprehensive inbuilt security framework at both device and server

level it is still susceptible to a number of potential attacks. These attacks vary in the degree to which the

user is involved but include, the device being backdoored, allowing confidential data to be exported from

the device and the device being used as a proxy for attackers

. Some of these attacks require applications

to be digitally signed thus limiting their likelihood, while others can be conducted by unsigned code.

However none of the attacks are purely autonomous with all requiring the user to be convinced to perform

a number of actions in order to be successful. Also, the viability of such attacks depends largely on the con-

figuration of existing controls on the BlackBerry device: i.e. Firewall, Application Control and IT Policy setup.

Using these available security mechanisms greatly reduces the risks associated with the attacks outlined

herein.

This document will present an attack surface analysis of the BlackBerry device; this analysis will include a

high-level review of architecture and related application attack scenarios. This research will distinguish

what can be done with signed versus unsigned code throughout the document. All observations are based

on a default retail configuration unless otherwise stated.

This research is based on a retail BlackBerry Pearl 8100 from network operator O2 Ireland

15,16

, with version

4.2 of the BlackBerry Software and BIS, but should be applicable to most modern BlackBerry models. Note

that BlackBerry devices can be customised by network operators and vendors before they are sold to users.

These changes are usually just cosmetic, but can include modification of MIDP permissions. This customiza-

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Blackberry JAVA DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT - - FUNDAMENTALS GUIDE Spezifikationen Seite 5